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DAMAGES-VOID

CONTRACT AS

MEASUItE OF CONTRACTOI'S

REcovER-When work is done or expense incurred in accordance with a contract which is void because through ignorance
or neglect some legal formality is not complied with, an interesting
problem arises concerning the rights of the several parties thereto.
Logically a void contract is a nullity; nothing has ever existed.
How then can the work be accounted for? Can the one for whom
it was done consider it as a gift and accept it with thanks? Or
must he pay for it, and how much? Can the one who does the work
be sued in trespass for coming upon the other's land and doing it?
The last question should probably be answered in the negative. The
RIGHT TO
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contract though void would at least be evidence that the work was
done on request, and was not officious intermeddling. In an action
for work and labor done by a brother a void contract to devise land
for such services was admitted to rebut the presumption that the
work was done gratuitously.' But further than this most courts will
not go.
Ail courts agree that there can be no recovery upon the void
contract. For what then can there be a recovery? Where there
has been performance in whole or in part by one party may he
rec-over? If so, must his performance have been in accordance
with the void contract? What shall be the basis of his recoverythe compensation stipulated in the contract, or a quantum mcruit?
Most states allow some recovery. But it must be upon some
implied or quasi contract. It must be remembered that indebitaWu
assumpsit is subject to any defense which may in good morals be
raised. Hence it is necessary that the plaintiff be dearly in a better
position than the defendant in order to recover. The cases arising
under the Statute of Frauds cover the ca e in some jurisdictions.
But in most an. oral contract under the Statute of Frauds is not
void but merely unenforceable ;-so that a contract exists upon
which rights might be predicated except that this would nullify the
effect of the statute. Thus in some jurisictions money paid under
an oral contract for the sale of land n1ay not be recovered if the
other party is willing to convey the land.2 This is expressly on
the theory that the contract is not void but only unenforceable
Similarly in some jurisdiciions one who has rendered services under
an agreement within the Statute of Frauds may not recover on a
quan:um meruit if the other party is willing to go on with the
contract as if it was enforceable. These decisions seem no more
than just. Why should one be allowed to take advantage of a
technical defense in a transaction in which he is equally blameworthy while the other is willing to complete the contract? However such decisions to that extent nullify the spirit if not the letter
of the statute.
But where one party has performed and the other has refused,
so that the first is dearly entitled to some compensation, he is
allowed to recover for his services their actual value without regard to the contract price.' This is allowed though the statute
SKettry v. Thumma, 9 Ind. App. 498 (,804).
'Coughlin v. Knowles, 7 Met. 57 (Mass. z843); Abbott v. Draper, 4
Denio Si (N. Y. 184).
'Couglin v. Knowles, see note x supv.
4Galvin v. Prentice, 45 N. Y. 162 (i871); Abbott v. Inslip, ag Ohio S9

(187s).

a Steel Works v. Atkinson, 68 IlL 421 (z873); Wallace v. Long,
5=2 (18).

Io5
nd.
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makes the contract absolutely void.$ This involves thi possibility
of a person paying more than the price called for in the contract;
or in money instead of land.' But this is inevitable if the contract is held void. It is no hardship to put the contract in writing,
or record it, or whatever the statute provides. If persons "suffer
by not complying with the statute it is a penalty due to their own
negligence and they have no reason to complain." I
The difficulties and apparent hardships of the strict law have
been seen by the courts of California and the contracts enforced
by a bit of legal camouflage. A statute of that state requires that
building contracts for over a certain sum shall be recorded, otherwise they shall be void and neither party shall- recover thereunder.
This statute was primarily for the benefit of mechanic's lien holders,
and naturally the first cases under it involved their rights. The
contracts were held void and the statutory consequences enforced
in favor of the lien holders. Then in an action between the
parties, the contract was declared void and inadmissible as evidence
of the value of the services performed in accordance therewith".
This case was overruled by the case of Laidlaw v. Maryi," on the
ground that the statute must mean absolutely void only as to the
material men and subcontractors who might have liens. The court.
evaded the express stipulation of the statute by saying that "the
contract must remain, not the basis of his recovery, but the measure
and test of his right to recover." Otherwise "the contractor may
build what he pleases, in any way that suits: him, and recover
where the contract has not been performed, not only the contract
price, but forty times the contract price"; "the owner will be compelled to accept a barn where he expected a house, and to pay for
a structure which he never wanted or contracted for, more than he
agreed to pay for the desired edifice."
This sounds rather specious but overlooks the fact that the
contractor must lay some implied promise to pay in order to
recover anything. No jury is liable to find an implied promise to
pay for a barn when the parties attempted to make a contract for
a house at one-fortieth the price. Moreover the contractor's only
excuse for being on the property is to fulfill the contract. It beng
void he only remains on the land by the grace of the owner, who,
however, will probably not exercise his right to put him off if he
at least substantially complies with the terms agreed upon. If the
owner allows .him to stay on and build, he should pay him the
'Thomas v. Hatch,
'Koch v. Williams,

S3

WLs.

26

(181).

82 Wi. 1&6 (092).

'See note 7, lP?.
°Wlliamette, etc. Co. v. College Co., 94 CaL z9 (1802).
'eRebman v. San Gabriel Co., 95 Cal. 390 (1892).
n 133 Cal. z7o (i9oz).
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reasonable value of his labor, and a contract to do so will be implied. If he so neglects his rights as to allow a violation of tne
terms that should be no excuse to one who has expended his money
and labor. He may in the first place refuse to allow the contractor
to enter until he has recorded the contract.
In Condon v. Donahue,12 it is expressly stated that the statute
.applies to actions between parties to the contract. But the principle
that the contract must be "the measure and test of the contractor's
right to recover," or at least the upper limit, is affirmned. A recent
case I' holds that the void contract measures the contractor's right
to retain money paid to him and allcws a recovery of a surplus
above the contract price paid by mistake.
There is a possible legal justification for this holding. Though
not a contract the writing might be regarded as an admission by
the parties of the value of the work to be done. It would as
such be admissible against a party who claimed a different value for
the work, and in that sense would be the "measure and test of the
contractor's right to recover."
However upon whatever theory this decision is supported, it
practically negatives, as far as the parties are concerned, the effect
of the statute which makes such contracts void. It seems questionable whether such a statute enacted for the protection of many
should be negatived to avoid hardship in those few cases where the
contractor made a bad bargain and would be able to recover more on
a quantum meruit than the contract stipulated.
E.X.V.
INDICTMENT' AND INFORMATIox-AccESSORIES BEFORE THE
FACT-INDICTMENT AS PRINCIPALS-At common law the offense of

being an accessory before the fact to a crime existed only when
the crime committed was a felony. If the crime committed were
treason or were a misdemeanor the procurer was a principal not
an accessory. In other words one who instigated another to commit treason or a misdemeanor was a principal in the treason or
misdemeanor actually committed, but the instigator of a successful
felony was an accessory only. The distinction was, however, procedural only, the punishment meted to the accessory in felony being
the same as that suffered by the convicted principal, just as the
punishment of the procurer in treason and misdemeanor was the
same as that of the principal or misdemeanant. The procedural
differences were two: first, the instigator in treason and misdemeanor could be tred at any time, whereas the accessory in felony
could not be put on trial until the principal had been convict(.d;
"i6o Cal. 749 (xx) ; see also Mannix v. Radke Co., z66 Cal. 3
'R. R. v. West, 167 Pa. 868 (1917).

(1913).
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second, in treason and misdemeanor the instigator could be charged
in the indictment as the actual doer of the crime, or the act of the
doer could be set out, and it could then be alleged that the instigator
procured the doing,' whereas in felony the instigator could not be
charged as the doer of the principal act, but the indictment had first
to aver the guilt of the principal and then to aver that the instigator,
before the doing of the principal felony, procured the principal to
commit the said felony.'
To remedy the failure of justice sometimes resulting from the
rule that the accessory in felony could not be tried until after the
principal had been convicted statutes have been passed in England
and some of our states. Some of these statutes, such as the one
in force in Pennsylvania, are very sweeping, providing that the
accessory "may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished, in all
respects as if he were a principal felon." Others, like the Virginia
statute of 1877, provide only that the accessory shall be punished
as if he were the principal felon, and that he "may be indicted,
tried and punished whether the principal felon be convicted or not,
or be amenable to justice or not."
Others, like the statute of Illinois, first define an accessory as
being one who advises, etc., another to commit a crime, and then
provides that he who thus advises, etc., "Shall be considered as
principal and punished accordingly."
Under the Pennsylvania statute providing in terms that the
accessory may be indicted, tried and punished -s if he were the
principal, it is held that the indictment may either charge him
specifically as a principal or as an accessory.
Under the Virginia statute, providing only, as it does, that the
accessory may be punished as if he were a principal, it has been
held that an accessory must be charged as an accessory, with having
procured another to commit the felony, and cannot be charged as a
principal-with having himself done the felonious act.4
The Illinois statute expressly defines an accessory as follows:
"Accessories-Before the Fact. Section 2. An accessory is he who
stands by, and aids, abets or assists, or who, not being present,
aiding, abetting or assisting, hath advised, encouraged, aided* or
abetted the perpetration of the crime. He who thus aids, abets,
assists, advises or encourages, shall be considered as principal, and
punished accordingly." Section 3 provides that "every such accessory..-may be indicted and convicted at the same time as the
principal, or before or after his conviction and whether the.pras3 Bish. New Cr. Proc, Sec. 2.
'3 BLis. New Cr. Proc., See. 9.

*Secs. 274, 275,. Cr. Code, Hurds" Star, ig9l, p. 81&
'Hatchett v. Con, 75 Va. 9.
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cipal is convicted or amenable to justice or not, and punished as
principaL"
In a recent Illinois case s one Snyder had procured another
to commit a felony. Snyder was indicted. In the body of the indictment Snyder was charged as an accessory, i. e., with procuring
R. to commit a certain felony, and in the concluding part of the
indictment it was averred that Snyder himself did the act constitutihg the felony, i. e., he was charged as a principal. The indictment was sustained. The court held that the statute abolished the
distinction between accessory before the fact and principals, and
said: "The pleader may, if he chooses, state the circumstances of
the offense as in an indictment against an accessory before the fact,
yet the indictment must contain an allegation charging the defendant as principaL"
In an earlier case in the same court, one who had procured
another to commit murder had been charged simply as an accessory, i. e., with having procured another to commit the murder,
without a further allegation that defendant had himself actually done
the killing-which indeed he had not-the court reversed judgment
against him, holding that the statute had abolished the offense of
accessory by making accessories principals, and that therefore as
no such offense existed an indictment charging only such offense
charged no crime.'
On the other hand in another case in the same jurisdiction T
the defendant who had procured another to commit murder was
indicted simply as a principal, as having himself committed the
act of murder. The court held that he was properly convicted on
such indictment though the evidence showed him to be guilty only
as accessory before the fact The court saying: "They (accessories) must be indicted as principals or not at all, for they are
declared by the act to be principals."
From these three cases it appears that in Illinois, under the
statute, the procurer of a felony cannot be indicted as an accessory
merely; that he can be indicted as a principal merely; and that he
may be charged in the statement as accessory by setting out the true
facts, and then averring that he actually did the act constituting
the substantive felony.
There are objections to both of the methods, upheld in the
cases cited, of indicting an accessory under such a statute. If he
is indicted merely as having himself done the act constituting the
substantive felony the indictment does not in the first place inform
him of the facts to be proved against him. He is charged with
having at a certain time and place impersonated B, whereas the
'People v. Snyder,

117

N. E. ixg.

'Fixmer v. People, zS3 Ill.

'Baxter v. People, 8 IlL 368

133.
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proof shows that at another time and place he paid X five dollars to
impersonate B. If he is charged in one part of the indictment with
having done certain accessorial acts and in another part with having
done the substantive felony; there is a repugnancy in the indictment
The best method would seem to be the one held erroneous b
the Illinois court, ii., that of simply charging the defendant wit
the acts in fact done by him. The indictment would then apprise
him of the "nature and cause of the accusation against him," would
truly inform him of the facts he would be called upon to meet,
there would be no variance between the facts charged and the facts
proved, and there would of course be no repugnancy in the indictment itself. Having been found guilty "as charged in the indictment" the provision of the statute becomes effective which declares
that "He who thus aids, abets, assists, advises or encourages, shall
be considered as principal, and punished accordingly." Ths is a
conclusion of law and conclusions of law need not be statel in the
indictment. This view has been taken by some courts, nctably the
California court. The California statute goes further than the
Illinois statute in that it provides that the accessory may be indicted.
tried and convicted and punished as though he were a principal.
In People v. Campbell, the court held that under this statute the
accessory must be indicted as an accessory and not as a principal.
The court said it is a fundamental principle in criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to be informed by the in.dictment of the particular acts which he is alleged to have committed,
as constituting the offense; and.if he in fact, only aided and abetted
the crime, the fact must be so stated in the indictment. He then
comes to the trial with a knowledge of the acts which are imputed
to him.
If the Illinois Legislature really intended to abolish the distinction between principal and accessory, as the court says it in fact
did, the method used was ill-chosen, in view of the fact that the
statute expressly defines an accessory and prescribes the time when
"such accessory" may be indicted. The holding of the court in
Fixrner v. People that such an indictment charged no crime since
the statute had abolished the offense of accessory by making accessories principals would seem to be untenable. The statute did not
abolish facts-it could not-on the contrary it expressly recited
the facts which were alleged against the defendant, and then proceeded to declare-a conclusion of law-that when these facts exist
th- defendant shall be "regarded as a principal and punished (not
conindicted) accordingly." The facts that :he statute recites as
stituting one guilty of the crime of being a principal were alleged
in the indictment, therefore under the statute the facts if proved
SAO tst

ia
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as laid, constituted the crime of being a principal. The facts plus
the statute charged the crime of being a principal, not the crime
of being an accessory as the court says.
William E. MikeU.
A LATiN PAsSAcGE IN B.ACKSTONE-Aigler's "Cases on Property," 1 contains a quotation from Blackstone as follows: "All corporeal hereditaments as lands and houses, are said to lie in livery;
and the others, as advowsons, commons, rents, reversions, etc, to
lie in grant. And the reason is given in Bracton: 'Traditio, or
livery, nihil aliud est quam rei corporalis de persona in personam,
de manu in manum, transtatio aut in possessionem traductio:sed
res incorporales, quae sunt ipsum jus rei vel corpori inhaerens,
traditionem non patiuntur' (livery is merely the transferring from
one person to another, from one hand to another, or the induction
into possession of a corporeal hereditament; but an incorporeal
hereditament, which is the right itself to a thing or inherent in the
person, does not admit.of delivery)."
The italicized passage is clearly wrong. It is incorrect as a
translation, showing that the translator did not know how to construe the Latin grammatically ;'and it makes bad sense logically and
legally. Taking the grammar first. "Jut rei" is not the way to
say in Latin "the right to a thing." "Jus in ren" or "jus in re"
or "jus ad rem," might have such a meaning. As a matter of fact
these several phrases have their respective technical meanings which
it is not my province now to discuss. "Corpus" does not mean
person. "Persona" has that meaning, whereas "corpus" is almost
the same as "res" except that it is not so extensive in its signification, denoting more definitely than "res," a physical, corporeal substance. Finally the word "vet" does not connect "sunt ipsum jus
rei" with "corpori inhaerens," which would be impossible Latin.
It connects "rei" with "corpori," both of which are governed by
"inhaerens," which in turn agrees with "jus!"
Logically and legally speaking, what is meant by the statement
that an inzorporeal hereditament is "the right itself to a thing, or
inherent in the person"?
The person in whom a right inheres is apparently the person
entitled, whereas when we speak of a "right to a thing," the thing
is the subject of the right, to use Austin's terminology. The connection of these two by "or" makes no sense, since they are
neither equivalent nor opposed. The only meaning the translator
could have attached to the expression would seem to be, "the right
to a thing inherent in a piece of land, or the right to a thing inherent
'Page if.
, Italcs Mine.
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in a person," i. r., he had in mind the distinction between, what is
known as a real and a personal servitude, or the distinction between
"appurtenant" and "in gross." But his language is anything but
illuminating. Or is it possible that he used "inherent .;h" as equivalent to "a right to," and intended'to distinguish between, say, a
right of common, which is a right in rcm, and an annuity, which is
a right in personam? Then his language is still more remote from
the idea he intended to convey.
All these are difficulties of the English translation. The Latin
original is quite clear. An incorporeal thing (or hereditament)
is according to the Latin, "a right attaching to a thing or body."
The thing or body is the subject of the right. The right attaches
to it in the same way as, let us say, color attaches to a surface, or
any quality attaches to an object. There is nothing at all said about
a person.
All this becomes clearer still if we consult the text of Bracton, whom Blackstone quotes. Strangely enough the passage as
Blackstone has it3 is not at all in Bracton, though the sense of
it is, and expressed in a way which could not possibly leave any
room for the translator's error. "Res incorporalis," it reads," "non
patitur traditioncrn,siut ipsum jus quod rei sivt corpori inhaereL"
Evidently the standard of precision in quoting an author was in
Blackstone's case not quite up to the mark as judged by our own.
All this being clear, the interesting question is, who is responsible for the translation? Blackstone himself never translates the
passages andphrases he quotes in foreign languages. Oneof the earliest
editions of Blackstone containing translations of the Latin quotations is the fourth edition of Cooley's Blackstone, edited by James
DeWitt Andrews, and publishea at Chicago in 1899. In his preface
to this fourth edition Mr. Andrews says, "The principal objects
sought in this edition are to render more easy the task of the
student of law and to exhibit clearly the relation of Blackstone's
Cbmmentaries to the subject of jurisprudence in general and to
American law in particular." And "to this end," the editor goes
on to say, "five methods are resorted to . . . Second.-Placmn
with the text and notes the translation of Latin phrases used
therein."
This edition contains the identical translation as found in Aigler. Lewis, in his preface to the first volume of his edition of
Blackstone, published in 1897, says, "I hope that law students, even
those familiar with Latin, will find useful the translation of phrases
not in Epglish whether in the text or notes. These translations I
have placed in brackets." Here too we find the same identical
translation as in Aigler and in Andrews.
SBk.. p. 317 *
Book 2, Ch. is, Ed. Twiss, Vol

4

1,p. 312.
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The source of all these translations is to be found in a little
b6ok by Jones. It is entitled, "A translation of all the Greek, Latin,
Italian, and French quotations which occur in Blackstone's CoMmentaries on the Laws of England; and also in the notes of the
editions by Christian, Archbold, and Williams. By J. V. Jones,
Esq., late of Gray's Inn, Philadelphia, 889." The author's preface,
however, bears the date, November ist, z823. The Philadelphia
edition is therefore a reprint of an earlier-English edition of the
year 1823 or thereabouts. In this preface the author after an encomium on Blackstone's Commentaries, says, "Many no doubt there
are, who in the perusal of his valuable pages find their progress
continually impeded by the old law Latin and Norman French left
uninterpreted by the author and his editors, and to such, consequently, a large and important portion of the work is mere dead
letter. To render it available to this description of its readers, the
following version is respectfully offered as a companion to Blackstone by the translator." On page 62 of this little book we read
once more the identical translation as above.
Isaac Husik.
LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS FOR LOSS OF, OR DAMAGE TO,

INTERSTATE SHIPMENTS TRANsPORTED ON RATES DEPENDENT ON
VALUE OR VALUATION-While the courts have agreed that a com-

mon carrier may not exempt itself from liability for loss of, or
damage to, shipments resulting from its own negligence, it is well
known that the decisions have been substantially at variance as to
the right of the carrier to limit its liability to a fixed amount where
the basis of liability is its own negligence.'
Since the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,2 there has
been a growing tendency on the part of the state courts to accept
the view, there adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States,
that such limitations are permissible.
There are some difficulties as to the principle governing this
doctrine, since it is not easy to understand why a carrier should
be permitted in case of its negligence to relieve itself from ninetenths of its own liability if it is to be prohibited from relieving
itself from ten-tenths. And, while the principle of estoppel has
been suggested in various cases including the Hart Case,' this can
Agreed Valuation as Affecting the Liability of Common Carriers for

Jegligence: 21 Harv. Law Rev. 32.
'112 U. S. 3t.
'Railway Co. v. Wynn, 88 Tenn. _%?m
'Sleat v. Flagg. S' B. & Aid. 432, particularly Bayley, J.'s, comment on
Batson v. Donovan. 4 B. & Aid. 21; Earncst v. Express Company, I Wood
(U. S.) 573; Oppenheimer v. U. S. Express Co., 69 Ills. 62; Hart v. P. R. R.,
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hardly be properly relied upon whem the carrier, through its agent
knows the true value of the property and the resulting measure of
liability. s
Pretermitting questions of legal validity it is dear that transportation rates might be based upon actual value or upon what
for convenience may be characterized as agreed value; or to state
the matter more concisely rates may be based upon value or vafustion. In the former case the carrier offers the reduced rate only
to that class of a particular commodity which does not excezd a
certain value. In the latter case the carrier offers the reduced
rate, no matter what the actual value of the commodity, if the
shipper will agree that in the event of loss or damage the value of
the shipment will be conclusively deemed to be a specified sum."
Manifestly each of these two kinds of rates has its own economic
basis, although there is a close relationship between them.
In the case of Hughes v. Pennsylvania Railroad,6 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the state courts might continue to apply their own rules in cases coming before them even
where the shipments were interstate, on the theory that Congress
had not at that time indicated its will to the contrary; but after the
passage of the so-called Carmack Amendment in 19o6 this view
was changed, and, as a result of the decision in Adams Express
Company v. Croninger,' the state courts were compelled to adopt
the federal rule in .connection with interstate shipments, whether or
not they had theretofore sustained the opposite rule, either as a
matter of common law or as the result of statutory provisious.
This gave rise to widespread dissatisfaction, particularly in
states originating shipments of live stock, and in consequence of
resulting agitation Congress passed the act of March 4, i955, cus-"
tomarily called the First Cummins Amendment.' This amendment
nullified all limitations of liability of the kind under discussion
except in the case of goods "hidden from view by wrapping, boxing or other means and [where] the carrier is not notified as to the
character of the goods," in which case the carrier was authorized
to require the shipper to specifically state in writing the value of
the goods and relieved of liability except to the extent of the stated
value.
112 U. S. 331 at pages 34o-34.

In this last-named case, the leading case on
the question, the original record shows that the carrier's agent knew that the
actual value of the horse exceeded the agreed value. This fact, though metioned in the argument by counsel for Hart (see page 335), is not adverted
to in the opinion of the Suprem-. Court.

'Agreed Valuation, etc.: 21 Harv. Law Rev. 3a.
i191 U. S. 477.
'34 Stat, at Large S84 sos.

'226 U. S. 491.

"39 Stat. at Large it97.
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The Interstate Commerce Commission, after a conference with
various interested parties, promulgated an opinion1 0 which gives
point to the underlying principles governing rates and ratings based
upon value or valuation, since the Commission holds that, while
this co-called Cummins Amendment invalidated contracts limiting
liability and condemned rates based upon valuation agreements, it
did not interfere with the establishment of rates based on value;
and, if a carrier elected to maintain such rates, a shipper who misstated the value of his property in order to obtain a better rate
than that applicable upon the basis of the actual value thereof
would be subject to the severe penalties provided by Section 1o of
the Act to Regulate Commerce."
As a consequence of this official announcement of the Commission-which was regarded as a correct interpretation of the lawthe railroad companies established sundry rates, including rates on
livestock, on the basis of actual value, instead of on the basis of
valuation, with the result that the shipping public found itself no
better off than prior to the passage of the First Cummins Amendment, since only by incurring the risk of indictment could the
shipper obtain the advantage of lower rates than those applicable
in accordance with the actual value of his shipment; and where
he did incur this risk the railroads declined to settle except on
the basis of the declared value insisting that this must be regarded
as the true value.
Further agitation developed an4 resulted in the passage by
Congress of the so-called Second Cummins Amendment on Augupt
9th, 1916,21 which, as indicated by the report of the Senate Co;mittee, was intended to cure this situation. However,- an examination 3of the text of this amendment, which is found in the
margin," shows clearly that Congress did not effectuate the inten"In re Cummins Amendment, 33 L C. C. 68z.
"33 1. C. C. 68a, at page 69&

=39 Stat. at Large 441.

1 BE iT ENACrED BY THE SENATE AND Housz o RtspsENTATrVI 0 Tzz
UsTrm STATES op AMERicA IN CONGRESs ASSEMBLED, That so much of ant Act

to amend an Act entitled "An Act to amend an Act entitled 'An Act to regulate commerce,' approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty
seven, and all Acts amendatory thereof and to enlarge the powers of the
Interstate Commerce Commission," approved March fourth, nineteen hundred and fifteen, as reads as follows, to wit: "
"PROVIDED, HowraE; That if the goods are hidden from view by wrapping
boxing, or other means, and the carrier is not notified as to the character of
the goods, the carrier may require the shipper to specifically state in writing
the value of the goods, and the carrier shall not be liable beyond the amount

so specifcally stated, in which case the Interstate Commerce Cowrmission
may establish and maintain rates for transportation, dependent upon the
value of the property shipped as specifically stated in writing by the chipper.
Such rates shall be published as are other rate schedules," be, and the same
is hereby, amended to read as follows, to wit:

NOTES
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tion of the Senate Committee. All that the amendment does is to
relieve baggage from the provisions of the First Cummins Amendment and to authorize rates and ratings based on valuation where
expressly permitted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, deny.
ing however to the Commiss;on the right to establish or maintain
rates based on valulation in the case of ordinary live stock. Rates
and ratings based on value ere left absolutely untouched by this
amendment and consequently are in exactly tie situation they were
prior to its passage, as explained by the Commission in its opinion
as to the scope, etc., of the First Cummins Amendment.
CommisNotwithstanding this fact the Interstate Commerce
1
sion in a recent opinion, viz., Live Stock Classification ' hold that
under the amended Cummins Amendment, i.e., the Second Cummins Amendment, they cannot authorize rates on ordinary livestock
should
which are based on value and state further that new rates
s
be provided at once which are not dependent upon value.
This view is in accordance with a similar view expressed by
the Commission in an opinion handed down a few months earlier,
viz., Express Rates, etc.," but it seems to disclose an effort to

effectuate the intention of the Senate Committee rather than a
correct legal appraisal of the amended Cummins Amendment. It
is interesting to know, however, that the eastern railroad companies under tariffs effective January ist, 1918, complied with the
injunction of the Commission and established a single rating on
ordinary live stock.
That the provisions hereof respecting liability for
or injury, notwithstanding any limitation of liadamage,
loss,
full actual
bility or recovery or representation or agreement or release as to value, and
declaring any such limitation to be unlawful and void, shall not apply, first,
to baggage carried on passenger trains or boats, or trains or boats carrying
passengers; second, to property, except ordinary live stock, received fotransportation cot.cerning which the carrier shall have been or shall hereafter be expressly authorized or required by order of the Interstate Coinmerce Commission to establish and maintain rates dependent upon the value
declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released
value of the property, in which case such declaration or agreement shall
have no other effect than to limit liability and recovery to an amount not
exceeding the value so declared or released, and shall not, so far as relates
to values, be held to be a violation of section ten of this Act to regulate
commerce, as amended; and any tariff schedule which may be filed with the
commission pursuant to such order shall contain specific reference thereto
and may establish rates varying with the value so declared or agreed upon;
-nd the commission is hereby empowered to make such order in cases where
rates dependent upon and varying with declared or agreed values would, in
its opinion, be just and reasonable under the circumstances, and coaditions
surrounding the transportation. The term 'ordinary live stock' shall include
all cattle, swine, sheep, goats, horses and mules, except such as are chic-fly
valuable for breeding, racing, show purposes, or other special uses."
"47 L. C. C. 335.
47 1. C. C. at page 344.
"43 1.C. C. Si.
"PowmD, Howzvz,
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From the practical point of view, therefore, the tailroads in
the east carry no ratings on ordinary live stock based on value.
Tiere still remain, however, ratings on certain other commodities
which are based on value, and it will no doubt be interesting to
observe whether application is made to the Commission to exercise
its power under the Cummins Amendments to expressly authorize
that these ratings be based on valuation rather than on value. Such
applications have been made in connection with certain commodities
and in some instances have been approved. And the Commission
has itself established ratings, based on valuation in connection with
certain
live such
stock ratings
other than
ordinary live stock.T
Where
are authorized
by the Commission a valid
limitation of liability is of course established; but where the carriers without the authority of the Commission continue rates based
on value, a correct interpretation of the Second Cummins Amendment would seem to leave the shipper just where he was prior to
its passage, in other words in the predicament described by the
Commission in its opinion as to the scope, etc., of the First Cummins
Amendment.
Henry Wolf BiklE.
"National Society of Record Assn's v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.
tt &L, 4o L C C 347.

R. Co.

